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The brain mechanisms underlying anxiety/stress and motivation have been investigated 
extensively. However, they were mainly investigated independently of each other. Even though 
some studies discussed interactions between these two mechanisms, our understanding of the 
interaction between anxiety/stress and motivation is still limited. Motivation can be divided into 
two aspects. One is appetitive motivation to win appetitive outcome, and the other is aversive 
motivation for avoiding aversive outcome. Accordingly, in current functional MRI study, it was 
investigated how appetitive/aversive motivational processing would be influenced by 
anxiety/stress. In the first experiment I investigated interactions between threat and reward 
processing during anticipation of electric shock and monetary reward. Analysis of skin 
conductance data during a delay phase revealed competitive interaction between threat and 
reward processing. Analysis of imaging data during a delay phase also revealed the interaction 
effect in several regions, including midbrain/ventral tegmental area, caudate, putamen, bed 
 
 
nucleus of the stria terminalis, anterior insula, middle frontal gyrus, and dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex. In the second experiment, the interaction between threat and 
reward/punishment processing was investigated. Analysis of imaging data during a delay phase 
revealed competitive interaction between threat and reward processing in left caudate. 
However, responses in the same site did show interaction between threat and punishment 
processing. Taken together, the findings in two studies suggest competitive processes of threat 
and reward, and independent processes of threat and punishment. 
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CHAPTER 1: Background 
In daily life, we are exposed to an overwhelming amount of information, but only have limited 
capacity to process the information. In order to guide behavior efficiently, the brain has to select 
stimuli which are “worthy” to be further processed. The selective mechanism enables an 
organism to achieve current goal, and ultimately to survive. Traditionally, two types of 
attentional control in selection mechanisms have been suggested. One is stimulus-driven 
(bottom-up) and the other is goal-directed (top-down; Corbetta&Shulman, 2002, for review). 
For instance in visual processing, a salient stimulus (e.g. yellow circle scattered with gray ones) 
would capture visual attention (bottom-up processing; e.g. Theeuwes, 1992), or visual attention 
can be assigned to task-relevant stimulus (top-down processing; e.g. Francolini & Egeth, 1979). 
The selective mechanism can also be applied to emotional processing. For instance, 
Ö hman (2002) suggested that affectively significant stimulus can be prioritized in the 
information processing. Emotional salient stimulus (e.g. snake) captures attention, resulting in 
faster detection than emotion-neutral stimulus. In line with his account, dual-competition model 
was proposed to explain interaction between emotion and cognition (Pessoa, 2009). According 
to the model, processing of emotional stimuli demand attentional/effortful resources which are 
required for other executive functions. The resources are limited in capacity, thus if attentional 
resources are utilized in processing of task-irrelevant emotional stimulus, cognitive processing 
for task performance is impaired. 
The competition of attentional/effortful resources is not limited to processes driven by 
physical stimuli. Recent studies have attempted to understand the impact of emotion on 
cognition in extended manner, such as mental states. According to Salzman and Fuzi (2010), a 
mental state is integration of feelings, intentions, memories, characteristics, etc., which adjusts 
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behaviors at the moment. Thus, an organism’s behavior depends on mental state, which can be 
divided as a function of valence – positive or negative.  
 
1.1. Negative mental state: anxiety/stress 
Anxiety can be defined as the mental state which is elicited by temporally, physically, and 
psychologically distal threat. Thus, it is a mental state activated by unpredictable threat, 
contrasting to fear which is responses to imminent danger (Davis et al. 2010, for review). In 
anxious or stressful circumstances, even though threat or danger is not imminent, adaptive 
responses would be required to be ready to take action against the unpredictable threat such as 
being vigilant or cautious (Robinson et al, 2013). According to recent proposals, the impact of 
anxiety or stress influences cognitive system by modulating attentional system (Derryberry and 
Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007; Pessoa, 2009). 
 
1.1.1. Cognitive processing in anxiety/stress 
It has been suggested that emotion-laden stimuli are prioritized in perceptual processing. For 
instance, threatening stimuli are detected faster in emotionally neutral ones (Ö hman et al., 
2002). It was proposed that salient stimuli that are especially important for survival are 
prioritized in processing. This framework can be extended to circumstances in which the impact 
of the negative stimulus is temporally extended. For instance, Phelps et al. (2006) showed that 
presentation of fearful face enhanced perceptual sensitivity to subsequent visual stimulus. In 
similar circumstances, even when the negative stimulus does not exist but negative mental state 
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(e.g. sadness) is induced the subsequent visual processing is influence by the negativity (Gasper 
& Clore, 2002). 
Recently, converging evidence indicates that anxiety or stress changes the information 
processing in the early stage by heightening vigilance or sensitizing stimulus features. For 
instance, Shackman et al (2011a) investigated neural activities while participants were 
performing visual discrimination task under threat of shock. When electric shock was 
anticipated, an early sensory-specific ERP components generated in extrastriate cortex (N1) 
were higher than safe. In another study about auditory processing, Cornwell et al. (2007) 
reported that the neural responses to an auditory oddball, measured by MEG, were heightened 
during threat block. Moreover, source localization analysis implied that activity in brain 
structures related to threat processing, such as amygdala and insula, was increased under threat. 
Similar results were also reported by Baas et al. (2006) in ERP component (wave V).  
The impact of threat-related processing on cognition also can be found in executive 
function, including cognitive control (Blair et al., 2007; Choi et al, 2012; Hart et al., 2010; Kanske 
and Kotz, 2010) and working memory (Anticevic et al., 2010; Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006). It has 
been suggested that anxiety or stress would impair the cognitive processing by dispersing 
attentional resources (Derryberry and Reed, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007). Similarly, dual-
competition model (Pessoa, 2009) suggests that anxiety or stress exploits attentional resources 
which are also necessary for executive function, resulting in the impairment of the performance. 
For instance, the Stroop task is often considered to require attentional control during the task 
performance (Roelofs, 2003 for review). Using a variant of Stroop task, Choi et al. (2012) showed 
that the conflict processing was compromised under threat of shock. In their study, a picture 
was presented as a target along with a distracting word. The distracting word could be either 
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matched to target picture (congruent condition), unmatched (incongruent condition), or string 
of Xs (neutral condition). Prior to the target display presentation, a cue was presented informing 
a chance of electric shock. The behavioral result revealed that the interference effect 
(incongruent vs. neutral) was increased under threat of shock than safe condition. 
Taken together, the findings indicate that anxiety/stress would enhance bottom-up 
attentional control to makes an organism vigilant to environment, resulting in enhancement of 
perceptual processing. However, the top-down attentional control would be impaired under 
anxiety/stress. In Stroop-like task (e.g. Choi et al., 2012) in which two types of stimulus is 
presented simultaneously (e.g. task-relevant and task-irrelevant), thus top-down control is 
required to select relevant stimulus or resolve the conflict between target and distractor. If the 
processing requires processing resources because of interference or maintaining working 
memory, anxiety/stress impairs the attentional control. 
 
1.1.2. Neural mechanism of anxiety/stress 
Previous studies have identified the amygdala as a key region in fear processing (LeDoux, 2000, 
for review). A number of animal and human imaging studies observed greater neural responses 
in amygdala to CS+ stimulus (paired with electric shock) comparing to CS- stimulus (Büchel et al., 
1998; LaBar et al., 1998; Lim et al., 2009). 
However, unlike imminent fear, anxious states or sustained fear elicit neural responses 
in the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST). A body of animal studies with lesions or 
pharmacological manipulations indicates that distal threat or context fear engages BNST 
processing (Walker and Davis, 1997; Sullivan et al., 2004). Imaging studies also reported that 
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BNST is involved in the processing of distal or unpredictable threat, such as anxiety state (Kalin 
et al., 2005; Mobbs et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2010 for a review). Some of 
these studies also reported recruitment of anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) during threat processing. The anterior insula is a hub region in salience processing 
(Menon&Uddin, 2010). Additionally, it is involved in the processing visceral sensory information 
and mapping the internal state of the body (Craig, 2002, 2009). Imaging studies with human 
(Banks et al., 2007; Mobbs et al., 2010) and non-human primates (Kalin et al., 2005) revealed 
that the medial PFC is involved in regulatory function of threat (Ochsner & Gross, 2005, for 
review). 
 
 1.2. Positive mental state: motivation 
When negative outcome is anticipated but uncertain, an organism would assess the risk of 
threat, and/or withhold action (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).  On the contrary, if a rewarding 
outcome is expected, behaviors towards the reward will be motivated. To investigate reward 
processing, the monetary incentive delay (MID; Knutson et al, 2000) task is commonly used in 
human cognitive experiments. In the MID task, typically, reward processing is manipulated by 
presenting a visual cue (e.g. dollar symbol). After a short delay period, a target display is 
presented. If participants respond fast and accurately, they receive a bonus monetary reward. 
 
1.2.1. Cognitive processing in motivation 
In general, anticipation of monetary reward enhances task performance. For instance, simple 
target detection was faster and accurate in reward trials than no-reward trials (Carter et al., 
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2009; Hardin et al., 2006; Zink et al. 2004). However, the shorter RT in reward trials might be 
due to general arousal effect by reward anticipation. In addition, experimental manipulation for 
reward condition would naturally enforce faster responses because participants were required 
to respond faster than certain threshold to obtain reward. 
Engelmann and Pessoa (2007, 2009) showed that motivation sharpens stimulus 
processing by manipulating level of motivation with multiple incentive values. In their 
experiments, a spatial cue was presented before target display. Participants were instructed to 
detect the spatial location of the target picture (left or right of screen) as quickly and accurately 
as possible. The behavioral results revealed that detection sensitivity (d’) increased 
parametrically with reward value, implying that reward anticipation does not simply evoke 
general arousal but has specific effect on perceptual processing. In their study (Engelmann et al., 
2009), functional imaging data revealed correlations of neural responses to the rewarding value 
in visual cortex, reward circuitry, and fronto-parietal attentional regions. In parallel, Rowe et al. 
(2008) showed that reward anticipation increased sensitivity to reward-relevant modality of 
stimulus while the sensitivity to reward-irrelevant stimulus modality was decreased. In addition, 
the modality specific effect of reward was observed in fronto-parietal network. These findings 
indicate that appetitive motivation enhances perceptual processing via adjusting attentional 
control. 
The impact of reward anticipation on cognition also can be found in executive function, 
including cognitive control (Padmala et al., 2011), spatial working memory (Kennerley & Wallis, 
2009), and response inhibition (Padmala & Pessoa, 2010). For instance Padmala et al. (2011) 
used a variant of Stroop task in which a picture was presented as a target stimulus along with a 
word as a distractor which could be either matched to target picture (congruent condition) or 
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unmatched (incongruent condition), or string of Xs (neutral condition). Prior to the target display 
presentation, a cue was presented informing motivational condition (reward or non-reward). 
The behavioral result revealed that the interference effect (incongruent vs. neutral) was 
decreased when monetary reward was expected. Functional imaging data revealed that neural 
responses in fronto-parietal regions during reward anticipation. 
Taken together, motivation seems to adjust bottom-up and top-down attentional control 
by enhancing perceptual sensitivity and allocation processing resources to win reward. 
 
1.2.2. Neural mechanism related to positive emotional state 
Midbrain dopaminergic neurons and their major target – the ventral striatum – play a key role 
as neural mechanisms of motivational processing. In the animal literature with physiological 
measurement as well as lesion and pharmacological manipulation, neurons have been found to 
respond during reward anticipation in the nucleus accumbens (NAc), putamen, and ventral 
tegmental area (Apicella et al., 1991; Bissonette et al. 2013; Phillips et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 
1992; Parkinson et al., 2000; Cardinal et al., 2002; Smith & Dickinson, 1998; Taylor & Robbins, 
1984; Cador et al, 1991). In human imaging studies using the MID task putative reward-related 
brain regions, including the NAc and dopaminergic midbrain, showed greater activation during 
processing of reward compared to no-reward cues (Carter et al. 2009; Knutson et al, 2001; 
Padmala et al., 2011).  
Other brain regions engaged in reward processing are anterior insula and medial PFC. 
Recent studies have observed activation in this region during appetitive processing, including to 
cues signaling monetary gains (Liu et al., 2011; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Samanez-Larkin, et al., 
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2007). Furthermore, anterior insula neurons increased responses when monkeys knew they 
would, or might receive, a reward based on performance (Mizuhiki, et al., 2012). In addition, 
many studies have reported dorsal ACC responses to reward, especially when the task requires 




Disposition of anxiety/stress and motivation is distinguishable not only in aspect of its valence 
(i.e. negativity and positivity), but also in the way of the impact on the attentional processing. 
According dual competition hypothesis (Pessoa 2009), the processing of emotionally salient 
stimuli competes with other executive functions for attentional resources. The resources are 
limited in capacity, thus, if attentional resources are used to process task-irrelevant emotional 
stimuli, concurrent or subsequent task performance is impaired. This hypothesis also can be 
applied to aversive/appetitive mental state. For instance when an electric shock is anticipated 
and unavoidable, attentional resources would be utilized in processing of the shock, resulting in 
impairment of task performance (e.g. Choi et al., 2012). On the contrary, if monetary incentives 
are expected depending on task performance, attentional control would be enhanced to 
maximize chance to win the reward (e.g. Padmala et al., 2011). In sum, anxiety/stress and 
motivation have contrasting effect on attentional control. 
Motivation can be divided into two aspects. One is appetitive (or approach), and the 
other is aversive (or avoidance) motivation (Elliot & Covington, 2001 for review). Both types of 
motivation are important determinants of behavior in the aspect of energization (Elliot 2006) or 
motivational salience (Zink et al, 2004). However, they differ in valence. The appetitive 
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motivation drives an organism toward appetitive stimuli/outcomes (i.e. reward anticipation) 
whereas the aversive motivation directs an organism away from aversive stimuli/outcomes (i.e. 
punishment anticipation). Some studies reported that not only monetary gains but also losses 
evoked similar activation in the striatum during the outcome anticipation (Carter et al., 2009; 
Wu et al., 2014). Other studies, however, showed that the level of activation (Tom et al, 2007) 
or location of activation (Seymour et al, 2007) in the striatum is dependent on motivational 
valence (i.e. reward or punishment anticipation). Based on the mixed results about appetitive 
and aversive motivation, it is still unclear what the neural substrates of these processes are, and 
how they are represented in the brain.  
The majority of research on appetitive and aversive processing has focused on 
behavioral and neural responses that occur when rewarding or punishing outcomes are 
delivered. However, less is known about how appetitive and aversive processes operate during 
the anticipation of an outcome and how they interact with each other during the anticipation. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, I will investigate how stress influences appetitive motivation as 
well as aversive motivation. Specifically, I will focus on how the threat of shock influences neural 




CHAPTER 2: Interaction between threat and appetitive processing 
Introduction 
The brain mechanisms underlying appetitive and aversive processing have been investigated, by 
and large, independently of each other. Although many investigators have discussed 
interactions between these two systems (e.g., Koob & Le Moal, 2008; Leknes & Tracey, 2008), 
our knowledge about how they may act simultaneously in the brain is rudimentary. Recent 
studies that investigated interactions between appetitive and aversive processing focused on 
decision making (Amemori & Graybiel, 2012; Park et al., 2011; Talmi et al., 2009). Overall, the 
understanding of appetitive-aversive interactions during basic perceptual and attentional 
processing is currently lacking. 
Midbrain dopaminergic regions and their projection sites in the striatum are implicated 
in appetitive processing (Delgado, 2007; Haber & Knutson, 2010; O'Doherty, 2004; Schultz et al., 
2000). However, these regions also participate in aversive processing, indicating that they are 
involved in both appetitive and aversive motivation (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Salamone, 
1994). Conversely, from the opposite valence, processing in the amygdala, bed nucleus of the 
stria terminalis, and anterior insula has been frequently linked with aversive events or stimuli 
(Adolphs & Tranel, 2000; Craig, 2002, 2009; Davis et al., 2010; LeDoux, 2000). Yet, these regions 
are engaged during appetitive processing, too (Everitt et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2011; Mizuhiki et al., 
2012; Salzman et al., 2007). Finally, several brain regions, including the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) during goal-directed behaviors, are 
engaged by both appetitive and aversive stimuli. Critically, in all these cases, little is known 
about how appetitive and aversive processing interact. 
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To investigate this question, I used both appetitive and aversive stimuli in a factorial 
design. Participants performed a variant of the monetary incentive delay task (Knutson et al., 
2000) during which different types of visual cues informed them about the chance of winning 
monetary reward and/or receiving a mild aversive shock (Fig. 1). The goal of current study was 
to investigate appetitive-aversive interactions during the anticipation period between the cue 
and target phases, thus allowing me to probe stimulus-independent processes. How does the 
simultaneous possibility of reward and shock affect brain and behavior? 
I tested two competing scenarios in key brain regions, including the midbrain, striatum, 
and anterior insula. According to the “salience hypothesis”, appetitive and aversive stimuli are 
represented in terms of their motivational salience. For instance, a recent electrophysiological 
study in monkeys uncovered dopamine neurons that were excited by both reward-predicting 
stimuli and airpuff-predicting stimuli (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). In the present study, the 
salience hypothesis predicts that, in the condition involving both reward and threat, activation 
would be enhanced relative to the “single” conditions because of increased salience. According 
to the “competition hypothesis”, reward and threat should trade-off against each other: in the 
condition involving both reward and threat, responses due to reward would be reduced during 
threat and responses due to threat would be reduced during reward. One reason a trade-off 
would be expected is because reward was task relevant while threat might function as a 
“distractor” – thus, it might lead to a competition for limited processing resources (Pessoa, 
2009). Another possibility is that, in some regions, evoked responses might trade-off if positive 
and negative systems are organized as “push-pull”, opponent systems (Konorski, 1967; Solomon 
& Corbit, 1974). As an example of opponency, pain reduces pleasure and reward induces 




Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Twenty-four volunteers participated in the study, which was approved by the Institutional 
Review Board of the University of Maryland, College Park. Based on self-report, subjects were 
free from psychiatric or neurological disease, or related past history. All participants were right-
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave informed written consent. Three 
Figure 1. Task design. (A) Subjects performed a variant of Monetary Incentive Delay task. During the 
threat-reward condition (shown here), a visual cue stimulus (diamond-shape overlaid with dollar sign) 
signaled that participants could win extra monetary reward if they respond accurately before the target 
display disappears and also a mild electric shock could occur at the onset of the target display (independent 
of the performance). Participants were instructed about the meaning of the cue stimuli prior to task 
execution. During the target phase, participants were asked to indicate whether the shape was a circle or a 
square. Following the target phase, participants received feedback about the monetary reward (B) Four 
different types of visual cues at the start of each trial informed participants about the chance of winning 
extra monetary reward and/or receiving a mild aversive shock. 
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participant’s data were excluded from the analysis because of head motion exceeding 3 mm. 
One other participant discontinued the experiment around the half-way mark and was excluded. 
Thus, data from twenty participants (27.92±4.61 years old; 12 females) were included in the 
final analysis. 
 
Stimuli and behavioral paradigm 
I employed a variant of the monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson, et al., 2000). Each 
trial started with the presentation of a compound visual cue (1 s) that was either rectangle- or 
diamond-shaped, and overlaid with a pound or dollar sign (Fig. 1A). The pound/dollar sign 
indicated the Reward condition (no-reward or reward) and the geometric shape (rectangle or 
diamond) indicated the Threat condition (safe or threat). Four different types of cues were used 
(Fig. 1B). The dollar sign indicated the chance of winning monetary reward if the response was 
made correctly before the display disappeared. The geometric shape (which was 
counterbalanced across participants), indicated that a mild electric shock could be delivered at 
the onset of the target display (independent of performance). To calibrate the intensity of the 
electric shock, each participant was asked to choose his/her own stimulation level immediately 
prior to functional imaging, such that the stimulus would be “highly unpleasant but not painful”. 
After each run, participants were asked about the unpleasantness of the stimulus and were 
asked to, if needed, re-calibrate it so that the shock still would be “highly unpleasant but not 
painful”. Shocks were administered with an electrical stimulator (Coulbourn Instruments, PA, 
USA) on the fourth (“ring”) and fifth (“pinky”) fingers of the non-dominant left hand. During the 
threat condition, physical shocks were administered on 50% of the trials at the onset of the 
target display (participants were not informed about the probability of shock).  
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In this study, my  goal was to investigate interactions between appetitive and aversive 
processing during the preparatory/anticipation period between the cue and target phases, 
which I refer to as the delay phase. To do so, the majority (75%) of trials had a long delay period 
of 12 s between cue and target phases, unlike most previous studies of the MID task, which 
have employed short intervals (2-5 sec) (Knutson et al., 2001; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Thus, 
this  design provided a measure of preparatory/anticipation activity that could be largely 
dissociated from transient events triggered by cue stimuli. During the remaining 25% of trials, a 
variable delay between 2-10 s was used to prevent subject expectancies from developing; these 
trials were excluded from the data analysis (see below). The shorter-delay trials also ensured 
that the onset of the target display (and hence the onset of physical shock when administered) 
was unpredictable to the participants. 
Following the delay, a target display was presented at the center of screen (Fig. 1A). 
Participants performed a shape discrimination task and were instructed to press the index finger 
button for circles and the middle finger button for squares with the right hand as fast and 
accurately as possible. The duration of the target display on each trial was adjusted dynamically 
(i.e., “staircased”) based on the participant’s performance. The initial target duration of all 
conditions was set to the same value and was calibrated for each participant based on a practice 
run (see below). For each condition, separately, if a correct response was made before the 
target display disappeared, the target duration on the subsequent trial of that condition was 
decreased by 34 ms; if an incorrect or slow response was made, the duration was increased by 
34 ms. This procedure was employed so that participants would be correct and respond before 
the target display disappeared, on average, 50% of the time in each condition – thus the task 
was quite challenging. As noted, during reward trials, reward was based on accurate and fast 
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performance. Consequently, participants were rewarded on about 50% of reward trials, the 
same proportion of physical shocks delivered during threat trials.  
One second after target onset, participants received visual feedback (1 s) indicating the 
outcome, as well as their cumulative earnings until that moment. During reward trials, 
participants won 50 cents per trial if they made a correct response before the target 
disappeared. On average participants earned $24 (beyond their base pay). During no-reward 
trials, participants earned zero cents irrespective of their performance. During incorrect or slow-
correct trials across all conditions, visual feedback containing the words “incorrect” or “slow”, 
respectively, was shown. Finally, a 5-10 s variable inter-trial interval (ITI) containing a white 
fixation cross ended the trial. To minimize the effect of physical shock on the subsequent trial, 
when a shock was administered, the ITI was set to 10 s. 
A practice run was performed during the anatomical scan. No cues were employed 
(and hence no reward or shock), and visual feedback about correct and incorrect/slow response 
was provided on each trial. The duration of the target display on the first trial of the practice run 
was set at 510 ms and was adjusted dynamically in the same fashion as mentioned previously. 
The final adjusted value was used as the initial duration of the target display for all the 
conditions in the main task. Participants were not informed that the practice run would be used 
to calibrate target duration for the main task. 
For the presentation of visual stimuli and recording of participant’s responses, 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) was used. Behavioral 
responses were collected using an MRI-compatible response box. Skin conductance response 
(SCR) data were also collected using the MP-150 system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., CA, USA) with a 
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10 Hz low-pass hardware filter at a sampling rate of 250 Hz by using MRI-compatible electrodes 
attached to the index and middle fingers of the left hand. 
Each participant performed 12 “runs” of the main task (10 runs for four participants). 
Each run consisted of 16 trials, resulting in a total of 192 trials and 48 trials per condition (160 
and 40, respectively, for four participants). All experimental conditions were intermixed in a 
pseudorandom fashion. 
 
MR data acquisition 
MR data were collected using a 3 Tesla Siemens TRIO scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany) with a 32-channel head coil (without parallel imaging). Each scanning 
session began with a high-resolution MPRAGE anatomical scan (TR = 1900 ms, TE = 4.15 ms, TI = 
1100 ms, 1 mm isotropic voxels, 256 mm field of view). Subsequently, for each functional run, 
138 EPI volumes were acquired with a TR of 2500 and TE of 25 ms. Each volume consisted of 44 
oblique slices with a thickness of 3 mm and an in-plane resolution of 3 X 3 mm (192 mm field of 
view). Slices were positioned approximately 30 degrees relative to the plane defined by the line 
connecting the anterior and posterior commissures, helping to decrease susceptibility artifacts 
at regions such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. 
 
General fMRI data analysis 
Pre-processing of the data was done using tools from the AFNI software package (Cox, 1996; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). The first 3 volumes of each functional run were discarded to 
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account for equilibration effects. The remaining volumes were slice-time corrected using Fourier 
interpolation, such that all slices were realigned to the first slice to account for timing 
differences. Six-parameter rigid-body motion correction within and across runs was performed 
using Fourier interpolation (Cox & Jesmanowicz, 1999), such that all volumes were spatially 
registered to the first volume. To normalize the functional data to Talairach space (Talairach & 
Tournoux, 1988), initially, each subject’s high-resolution MRPAGE anatomical volume was 
spatially registered to the so-called TT_N27 template (in Talairach space) using a 12-parameter 
affine transformation; the same transformation was then applied to the functional data. All 
volumes were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter with a full-width at half maximum of 6 
mm (i.e., two times the voxel dimension). Finally, the signal intensity of each voxel was scaled to 
a mean of 100. 
 
Voxelwise analysis 
Each participant’s fMRI data were analyzed using multiple regression in AFNI. There were a total 
of four main event types in the design matrix: no-reward and reward events, separately for the 
safe and threat conditions. The trials that involved short delay periods (< 12 s) were modeled 
separately using an additional regressor of no interest (pooled over all four conditions). 
Constant, linear, and quadratic terms were included for each run separately (as covariates of no 
interest) to model baseline and drifts of the MR signal. To account for the signal variance related 
to head motion, six estimated motion parameters were included as nuisance regressors in the 
model. Given that all three phases (cue, delay, and target) of each trial followed the same 
sequential order and timing (excluding short delay period trials), I estimated the “combined” 




function. Responses were estimated starting from cue onset to 30 s post onset using cubic 
spline basis functions. This method is closely related to the use of finite impulses (“stick 
functions”), the commonly employed technique that can be considered the simplest form of 
basis expansion. Cubic splines allow a smoother approximation of the underlying responses, 
instead of the discrete approximation obtained by finite impulses. As an index of delay-phase 
activation, I averaged the estimated responses at 10 and 12.5 s after cue onset (as determined 
via the spline-based estimates) for all four main event types, separately. I used the average of 
these two points as the stimulus-independent delay-phase response would be maximal at these 
time points while the effect of transient cue phase responses would be minimal (see Fig. 2 
showing visual responses). This method of indexing delay-phase activation is similar to the 
commonly used method of indexing working memory maintenance- related activity in delayed 
match-to-sample paradigms (Pessoa et al., 2002; Ranganath & D'Esposito, 2001) 
I did not exclude trials containing physical shock as the shock was delivered at the onset 
of the target display, and the goal of current study was to investigate responses prior to that, 
namely delay-phase responses. 
 
Figure 2. Responses in the visual cortex. 
Average estimated hemodynamic response 
(pooled over four conditions) from visual 
cortex (x = 38, y = -50, z = -17) illustrating 
that activity at 10 and 12.5 sec post cue 
onset had minimal contribution from the 




Whole-brain voxelwise random-effects analyses were restricted to gray-matter voxels based on 
the FSL automated segmentation tool [“FAST” (FMRIB's Automated Segmentation Tool)] 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). A 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was run to investigate the 
interactions between Reward (no-reward, reward) and Threat (safe, threat) based on delay 
phase responses. The alpha-level for voxelwise statistical analysis was determined by 
simulations using the 3dClustSim program of the AFNI toolkit. For these simulations, the 
smoothness of the data in three directions was estimated using 3dFWHMx on the residual time 
series of gray-matter voxels in each participant and then averaged across participants (FWHMx = 
7.61 mm; FWHMy = 7.63 mm; FWHMz = 7.40 mm). Based on a voxel-level uncorrected alpha 
of .005, simulations indicated a minimum cluster extent of 34 voxels for cluster-level corrected 
alpha of .05. I did not analyze the data from cue and target phases because they were possibly 
contaminated with rising and falling portions of the delay-phase signals, respectively. 
 
Plotting effects for regions of interest (ROIs) 
In order to plot the response patterns of the loci showing significant Reward x Threat 
interactions during the delay phase, I carried out an ROI analysis. For each participant, ROIs 
were defined in an independent fashion by using a leave-one-subject-out method. For each 
subject, I first created 5-mm radius spherical ROIs using the peak voxel locations of the 
interaction from the 2 x 2 ANOVA based on data from all subjects, except that subject. Then, for 
each of the four main conditions of interest, delay-phase responses of voxels that showed a 
significant interaction effect in the “left-out” participants were averaged within the participant’s 
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ROI. I repeated this procedure for each subject and thus was able to plot the interaction pattern 
for each ROI defined in a non-biased fashion. 
 
Conjunction analysis 
In order to identify brain areas activated during the processing of both reward and threat stimuli, 
I conducted a conjunction analysis (Friston et al., 2005; Nichols et al., 2005), based on delay 
phase responses. To do so, I initially created two statistical brain masks based on voxels that 
showed a significant simple effect of Reward (reward vs. no-reward during the safe condition; 
cluster-level alpha: .05) and, separately, a significant simple effect of Threat (threat vs. safe 
during the no-reward condition; cluster-level alpha: .05). I then created an intersection map of 
these two masks, which revealed voxels with significant common activation. 
 
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
Skin conductance data from one participant data were excluded due to technical problems 
during data collection. Data from the remaining participants were initially smoothed with a 
median-filter over 50 samples (200 ms) to reduce scanner-induced noise and resampled at 1 Hz. 
The pre-processed SCR data were analyzed using multiple regression in AFNI in a similar way as 
fMRI data; for related approaches, please see Bach et al.(2009),  and Choi et al., (2012). No 
assumptions were made about the shape of the SCR function. The average response to each trial 
type was estimated via deconvolution. Variance related to the effect of physical shocks on SCR 
responses was removed prior to deconvolution. Responses were estimated starting from event 
onset to 30 s post onset using cubic spline basis functions (see fMRI analysis above for further 
discussion). Trials that employed a short delay period (< 12 s) were modeled separately using an 
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additional regressor of no interest (pooled over all four conditions). Constant and linear terms 
were included for each run separately (as covariates of no interest) to model baseline and drifts 
of the SCR. As an index of delay response, for each condition, I averaged estimated SCRs 
between 10-13 s post cue onset (similar time range as used in the imaging data analysis) and 
subtracted the baseline SCR of each condition (response at cue onset). Finally, in order to help 
with normality of the data, response-strength indices were transformed by using a logarithm 
function [log10(1+SCR)]. Then, a 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was run to investigate 
interactions between Reward (no-reward, reward) and Threat (safe, threat).  
 
Behavioral data analysis 
Trials during which actual physical shocks were delivered were discarded from the analysis, thus 
leaving 24 trials in the threat conditions (no-reward and reward) and 48 trials in the safe 
conditions (no-reward and reward). Trials in which participants made incorrect responses (18%) 
were excluded from further behavioral analyses, but “slow” trials during which a correct 
response was made after the target disappeared were included. For each participant, mean RT 
data were determined as a function of Reward (no-reward, reward) and Threat (safe, threat). 
ANOVAs were conducted on the mean RT data, with those variables as within-subject factors. 





Skin Conductance Responses 
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) during the delay phase were evaluated according to a 2 
Reward (no-reward, reward) x 2 Threat (safe, threat) repeated-measures ANOVA. The main 
effects of Threat and Reward were significant (F1, 19 = 11.79, p = .0028 and F1, 19 = 5.84, p = .0259, 
respectively). SCR was greater during threat compared to safe trials, as well as during reward 
compared to no-reward trials. Notably, a statistically significant Reward x Threat interaction was 
obtained (F1, 19 = 6.43, p = .0202), such that the increased SCR during threat (vs. safe) trials 
during the no-reward condition was reduced during reward and the increased SCR during 
reward (vs. no-reward) during the safe condition was reduced during threat (Fig. 3A).  
 
 
Figure 3. SCR and behavioral results. (A) SCR data during delay phase revealed significant 
interactions between threat and reward processing, where effect of threat was reduced by reward and 
effect of reward was reduced by threat. (B) Reaction time data revealed a marginally significant 
interaction between threat and reward. Error bars in all panels denote the standard within-subject 




Mean RT data were evaluated according to a 2 Reward (no-reward, reward) x 2 Threat (safe, 
threat) repeated-measures ANOVA (Fig. 3B). The main effect of Reward was significant (F1, 19 = 
49.02, p = .0001). Mean RT was faster during the reward (395 ms) compared to the no-reward 
condition (444 ms), demonstrating the effectiveness of the motivational manipulation. The 
threat condition also showed faster responses (414 ms) compared to the safe (425 ms) 
condition, revealing a main effect of Threat (F1, 19 = 13.88, p = .0014). It is possible that, although 
threat was irrelevant to the task, cues signaling shock might have increased arousal (as indicated 
by SCR data), which might have speeded motor responses. The Reward x Threat interaction was 
marginally significant (F1, 19 = 3.52, p = .0761). This trend-level result was observed given that 
faster RTs during reward relative to no-reward trials during the safe condition (56 ms) were 
numerically reduced during the threat condition (43 ms).  
 
Functional MRI results 
The main goal of this study was to investigate interactions between appetitive and aversive 
processing during the anticipatory/delay phase. Accordingly, I ran a 2 Reward (no-reward, 
reward) x 2 Threat (safe, threat) voxelwise repeated-measures ANOVA based on estimated 
responses of the delay phase. I observed a main effect of Reward in several structures, including 
dorsal ACC and, bilaterally, midbrain/ventral tegmental area (VTA), caudate, putamen, nucleus 
accumbens, and anterior insula; in all cases, responses during reward were greater than no-
reward (Table 1). I also observed a main effect of Reward in “default” brain regions (Raichle et 
al., 2001), where responses decreased during reward (vs. no-reward). A main effect of Threat 
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was observed in dorsal ACC, bilateral middle frontal gyrus (MFG), left inferior frontal cortex, and 
right inferior fontal cortex extending into the anterior insula; in all cases, responses during 
threat were greater than during safe. Critically, a significant interaction between Reward and 
Threat was observed in the right midbrain/VTA, right caudate, bilateral putamen, bilateral 
thalamus, bilateral frontal eye field, bilateral anterior insula, right MFG, and dorsal ACC (Fig. 4). 
As illustrated in Fig. 5A, a trade-off between reward and threat processing was observed in the 
right midbrain/VTA, such that the effect of reward (reward vs. no-reward) during the safe 
condition was reduced during threat; likewise, the threat effect (threat vs. safe) during no-
reward was reduced during reward. Note that, although the coordinates of the midbrain site I 
report are consistent with the VTA (Adcock et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2009), given the spatial 
resolution of the fMRI signal, spatial smoothing, and size of this structure, this label should be 
interpreted as “suggestive”. For additional regions, see also Figure 5B-5D & 6A-6D. 
Figure 4. Delay phase responses. Voxels that showed significant interaction between threat and reward 
(displayed at p < 0.05, cluster-level corrected). MB/VTA, midbrain/ventral tegmental area; dACC, dorsal 




Figure 5. Delay phase responses. (A) Mean estimated hemodynamic responses from the 
right midbrain/VTA ROI (left panel), where the gray area indicates delay-phase responses. 
On the right panel, these responses are shown as a bar plot (B) Right ventral caudate ROI. 
(C) Left Putamen ROI. (D) Right thalamus ROI. Error bars in bar plots denote the standard 




Figure 6. Delay phase responses. (A) Mean estimated hemodynamic responses from the 
right anterior insula ROI (left panel), where the gray area indicates delay-phase responses. 
On the right panel, these responses are shown as a bar plot (B) Dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex ROI. (C) Right frontal eye field ROI. (D) Right middle frontal gyrus ROI. Error bars 






In the results reported above, delay-phase responses might have been partly confounded with 
motor preparatory signals associated with the target phase. One way to partially address this 
possibility is to investigate the role of RT in the observed responses. Accordingly, I repeated the 
analysis above, but now including an additional parametric RT regressor (mean corrected). I 
Figure 7. Conjunction analysis at delay phase. (A) Voxels that showed significant common 
activation during threat (vs. safe during no-reward) and reward (vs. no-reward during safe) are 
shown in yellow color. For illustrative purposes only (with no inferential interpretations), voxels 
that showed significant activation during threat (vs. safe during no-reward) but not in reward (vs. 
no-reward during safe) are shown in red color. In a similar fashion, voxels that showed significant 
activation during reward (vs. no-reward during safe) but not in threat (vs. safe during no-reward) 
are shown in green color. (B) Voxels that showed significant common activation during threat (vs. 
safe during no-reward) and reward (vs. no-reward during safe) are shown in yellow color and the 




reasoned that this additional regressor would model variance related to fluctuations in motor 
preparation across trials as indexed by RT values. Importantly, this control analysis also revealed 
significant Reward x Threat interactions in all the regions reported above, minimizing the 




To identify brain regions commonly engaged by reward and threat processing, a conjunction 
analysis was run based on delay-phase responses of simple reward and simple threat effects. 
The conjunction analysis revealed clusters of common activation in several brain regions, 
notably, right midbrain/VTA, right ventral caudate, right thalamus, bilateral anterior insula, 
dorsal ACC, and bilateral MFG (Fig 7; Table 2). I also inspected the consistency of the simple 
effects in individual participants as, in theory, there could be clusters of common activation at 
the group level without a clear counterpart in the individuals. For each region, I list the number 
of participants exhibiting the two simple effects (final column in Table 2), indicating that the 
conjunction did not originate from the group analysis process. 
 
Amygdala ROI analysis 
In the above analyses, I did not observe significant results in the amygdala. But given the 
theoretical importance of the amygdala in emotional processing, I conducted an additional ROI 




anatomy (Fig. 8A). In each ROI, a representative time series was created by averaging the 
unsmoothed time series from all gray-matter voxels within the ROI. Then, as in the whole-brain 
voxelwise analysis, multiple regression was run on the representative time series data to 
estimate the hemodynamic response function of four main regressors of interest. A 2 X 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA was then run to probe potential interactions between Reward (no-
reward, reward) and Threat (safe, threat). Analysis of delay-phase data revealed only a 
significant main effect of Reward in the left amygdala ROI, such that responses were reduced 
during reward compared to no-reward (Table 3; Fig. 8B-8C). 
 
  
Figure 8. Responses in the amygdala. (A) Coronal slice of the TT_N27 template brain in AFNI 
showing the voxels within the anatomically defined amygdala (black outline). (B) Mean estimated 
hemodynamic response functions of four conditions from the left amygdala ROI. (C) Mean estimated 
hemodynamic response functions of four conditions from the right amygdala ROI. In B and C, the gray 
area indicates the response estimates related to delay phase. Error bars in bar plots denote the standard 




BNST ROI analysis 
I also investigated basal forebrain sites consistent with the BNST, a structure implicated in 
anxiety-related mechanisms (Davis, et al., 2010). In the whole-brain voxel-wise analysis reported 
previously, the ventral caudate cluster posteriorly extended into the basal forebrain. Given that 
the BNST is a small region and the voxel-wise analysis was done on spatially smoothed data, I 
conducted an additional ROI analysis. Left and right BNST ROIs were defined anatomically 
according to the atlas of Mai et al., 1997 (see also Alvarez et al., 2011, Fig. 9A). Talairach x-
values were restricted between 3 and 8 mm, y-values were restricted between -1 and 3 mm, 
and z-values were restricted between -1 and 6 mm. For this analysis, I resampled the functional 
data to a finer 2 x 2 x 2 mm voxel grid and no spatial smoothing was applied. For each ROI, a 
Figure 9. Responses in the BNST. (A) Coronal and axial slices of the TT_N27 template brain in 
AFNI showing the voxels within the anatomically defined BNST (black outline). (B) Mean estimated 
hemodynamic response functions of four conditions from the left BNST ROI. (C) Mean estimated 
hemodynamic response functions of four conditions from the right BNST ROI. In B and C, the gray 
area indicates the response estimates related to delay phase. Error bars in bar plots denote the standard 
within-subject error term (Loftus & Masson, 1994) for the two-way interaction. 
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representative time series was created by averaging the unsmoothed time series from all the 
gray-matter voxels that fell inside the anatomically defined ROI. Then, regression analysis was 
run to estimate condition-specific responses. A 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was 
subsequently run to probe potential interactions between Reward (no-reward, reward) and 
Threat (safe, threat). Analysis of delay-phase data revealed a main effect of Reward in both 
BNST ROIs, such that responses were increased during reward compared to no-reward; and a 
main effect of Threat in the left BNST ROI, such that responses were increased during threat 
compared to safe. Critically a significant interaction between Reward and Threat was observed 
in the right BNST (Table 4; Fig. 9B-9C), such that the effect of reward was reduced during threat 
and the effect of threat was reduced during reward. The right BNST ROI also showed simple 
effects of both Reward (reward vs. no-reward during the safe condition: t(19) = 5.11, p = .0001) 
and Threat (threat vs. safe during the no-reward condition: t(19) = 2.67, p = .014).  
 
Discussion 
To investigate the interactions between appetitive and aversive processing, I used a task with 
cues signaling the chance of monetary reward and/or mild aversive shock. The experimental 
design allowed me to measure responses during the preparatory/anticipatory delay phase with 
minimal contamination from other task phases, thus enabling me to probe stimulus-
independent processes. SCR data revealed interactions between reward and threat during the 
delay phase. Imaging data during this phase revealed interactions between reward and threat in 
several key brain regions, including the midbrain/VTA, striatum, BNST, anterior insula, right MFG, 
and dorsal ACC. Overall, the results support the competition hypothesis and not the salience 
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hypothesis: when reward and threat were jointly present, reward opposed the effect of threat 
([threat vs. safe]REWARD < [threat vs. safe]NO-REWARD) and threat opposed the effect of reward ([reward 
vs. no-reward]THREAT < [reward vs. no-reward]SAFE). 
Midbrain structures and the striatum are engaged by appetitive processing (Delgado, 
2007; Haber & Knutson, 2010). But recruitment of these regions is not limited to appetitive 
conditions. They take part in the processing of aversive stimuli (Baliki et al., 2010; Becerra et al., 
2001; Brischoux et al., 2009; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009; Roitman et al., 2005), financial 
losses (Carter, et al., 2009), anticipation of mild shocks (Jensen et al., 2003), and aversive 
learning (Delgado et al., 2008). The engagement of these regions during both positive and 
negative contexts has led to the idea of their role in “motivational salience” (Carter, et al., 2009; 
Jensen, et al., 2003; Jensen et al., 2007; Metereau & Dreher, 2012). The results in current study 
demonstrated instead that simultaneous reward and threat information opposed each other. 
Together, the findings demonstrated competition during the processing of motivationally salient 
stimuli of opposite valence. Of note, when presented alone, appetitive and aversive cues evoked 
delay-phase responses in the midbrain and striatum (Fig. 7A). 
In the nucleus accumbens, consistent with prior studies (Knutson, et al., 2001; Schultz et 
al., 1992), a main effect of Reward was observed during the delay phase. But, neither a main 
effect of Threat nor an interaction was observed. The absence of a threat effect was somewhat 
unexpected given the rodent literature (Roitman, et al., 2005; Schoenbaum & Setlow, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the results are consistent with some studies in humans that did not observe 
accumbens activation during anticipation of mild shocks (Choi, et al., 2012) and aversive pictures 
(Grupe et al., 2012). Future studies using other types of aversive conditions, such as monetary 
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losses (Carter, et al., 2009), are needed to clarify potential interactions between appetitive and 
aversive processing in this region.  
The anterior insula is involved during the processing of negative events, such as cues 
signaling monetary losses (Knutson & Greer, 2008), as well as the anticipation and experience of 
aversive stimuli (Paulus & Stein, 2006; Simmons et al., 2006). The anterior insula also has been 
implicated in risk aversion (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). Yet, recent studies have observed 
activation in this region during appetitive processing, including to cues signaling monetary gains 
(Liu, et al., 2011; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Samanez-Larkin, et al., 2007). Furthermore, anterior 
insula neurons increased responses when monkeys knew they would, or might receive, a reward 
based on performance (Mizuhiki, et al., 2012). Here, I also observed the effect of reward and 
threat in the bilateral anterior insula during the delay phase (Fig. 7A). Critically, threat and 
reward processing opposed each other when simultaneously presented. 
I did not observe a main effect of Threat or an interaction in the amygdala during the 
delay phase. This null finding is not entirely surprising because, as proposed by Davis, Grillon, 
and colleagues (2010), responses in the amygdala may be more closely tied to phasic CS+ stimuli 
signaling “fear” or transient cues that signal aversive stimuli (Grupe, et al., 2012), as opposed to 
the periods of temporally extended and less predictable threats. Of note, in my previous study 
(Choi, et al., 2012), as well as in a study by Somerville and colleagues (2010), greater amygdala 
responses were not detected during threat monitoring over a temporally extended period. 
 Another region that is involved in threat processing is the BNST in the basal forebrain, 
especially during conditions involving temporally extended and/or less predictable threat 
(Alvarez, et al., 2011; Davis, et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 2013; Somerville, et al., 2010). 
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Intriguingly, studies have also reported the involvement of BNST in appetitive processing 
(McGinty et al., 2011). This region, which is small and has a complex anatomy, is challenging to 
investigate with functional MRI. Here, I investigated BNST responses based on an anatomical 
ROI and unsmoothed data. The right BNST was activated by both threat and reward during the 
delay phase. In addition, a significant interaction was detected there during the delay phase, 
such that reward and threat traded-off against each other.  
 In the context of aversive processing, the thalamus has been reported to be involved 
during the anticipation and experience of negative picture stimuli (Goldin et al., 2008; Herwig et 
al., 2007), anticipation of mild aversive shocks (Choi, et al., 2012)and pain processing (Casey, 
1999). At the same time, however, the thalamus participates in appetitive motivational circuits 
together with striatal and midbrain regions (Kalivas & Nakamura, 1999). The involvement of the 
thalamus in appetitive processing is further supported by human imaging studies with monetary 
incentives (Engelmann et al., 2009; Galvan et al., 2005; Knutson, et al., 2001) and related studies 
in nonhuman animals (Balleine, 2005; Gaffan & Murray, 1990; Minamimoto et al., 2005). In the 
current study, delay-phase responses in the thalamus were observed during threat as well as 
reward (Fig. 7A). In addition, I observed a significant interaction between reward and threat 
during the delay phase where reward and threat competed against each other when presented 
simultaneously. 
The dorsal ACC participates in both appetitive and aversive processing, especially during 
goal-directed behaviors, suggesting that it plays an important function in “adaptive control” 
(Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Shackman et al., 2011b). Many studies have reported dorsal ACC 
responses to reward (Bush et al., 2002; Shidara & Richmond, 2002; Shima & Tanji, 1998) and 
threat (Etkin et al., 2011; Ploghaus et al., 1999) stimuli. Here, dorsal ACC responses during the 
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delay phase revealed simple effects of reward (vs. no-reward during the safe condition) and 
threat (vs. safe during the no-reward condition). Again, a competitive interaction between 
reward and threat was observed during the delay phase.  
Whereas the dorsolateral PFC is important for cognition in general, it also has been 
proposed to be an important convergence site for the integration of both motivation and 
cognition (Kobayashi et al., 2002; Leon & Shadlen, 1999; Watanabe, 1996) and emotion and 
cognition (Erk et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2002). In a consistent fashion, here I observed an 
interaction between reward and threat processing in the right MFG during the delay phase such 
that reward and threat traded-off against each other.  
I also observed a trade-off interaction in the frontal eye field (FEF), bilaterally, during 
the delay phase. In addition, the FEF showed a main effect of Reward. These findings are 
intriguing because the FEF is important for attention (Armstrong et al., 2006; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Moore & Armstrong, 2003). I interpret the main 
effect of Reward in terms of attention given that, upon seeing the reward cue, participants likely 
up-regulated attention (as indicated by faster RTs). If this interpretation is correct, the 
counteracting effect of threat on FEF responses suggests that threat might have interfered with 
attention. In any case, the interaction reveals that reward and threat interact in frontal sites that 
are important for attention and other related cognitive functions. 
 
Competition 
The interaction effect in current study revealed a trade-off between reward and threat 
processing consistent with competitive interactions. Notably, voxels exhibiting the interaction 
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overlapped with those exhibiting simple effects of both reward and threat (Fig. 7B), revealing 
that many of the areas influenced by both reward and threat are also sites of competitive 
interactions. 
The trade-off pattern observed here is consistent with several independent lines of 
studies. For example: reward and pain signals interacted in the calculation of subjective value 
underlying behavioral choice (Park, et al., 2011); pain reduced reward sensitivity during a 
decision making task (Talmi, et al., 2009); stress reduced reward-related responses in medial PFC 
(Ossewaarde et al., 2011); and acute stress decreased reward responsiveness (Bogdan & 
Pizzagalli, 2006) and reward outcome responses (Porcelli et al., 2012). In particular, the 
reduction of the threat effect during reward in current study is consistent with findings from the 
startle reflex, where blink responses are reduced during anticipation of rewards (Hackley et al., 
2009; see also Lang et al., 1998). 
Why is the trade-off pattern observed in the present study? A possible reason is 
because reward was task relevant while threat might have functioned as a “distractor”. In this 
way, they might have acted against each other in a way that can be recast in terms of 
competition for limited processing resources (Pessoa, 2009). This explanation is attractive when 
sites such as the FEF are considered given their association with attention. The explanation is 
less appealing, perhaps, when regions such as the midbrain are concerned. Although some 
researchers have proposed that these regions can also be viewed as associated with “effort” 
(Boehler et al., 2011; Horvitz, 2000; Salamone et al., 2009), it is possible that the trade-off 
reflected the organization of positive and negative systems into opponent motivational systems 
(Konorski, 1967; Solomon & Corbit, 1974), which would operate in a push-pull fashion. Note, 
however, that the current experiment was not designed to arbitrate between these two 
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scenarios as reward was contingent on performance but shock was not. I used this asymmetric 
design to evaluate the salience and competition hypotheses, and not different types of 
competition mechanisms.  
In conclusion, using a factorial design, I investigated stimulus-independent interactions 
between processing of appetitive and aversive stimuli in normal healthy adult volunteers. The 
results from SCR data revealed a trade-off between reward and threat processing. Paralleling 
the SCR data, imaging data also revealed a trade-off pattern in regions such as midbrain, 
striatum, BNST, anterior insula, right MFG and dorsal ACC, revealing conditions during which 




Table 1. Voxelwise analysis at delay phase (Peak talairach coordinates, F(1,19) and t(19) values) 
  
Reward x Threat  Reward  Threat 
Peak Location   x y z F   x y z t   x y z t 
Occipital                               
Middle occipital gyrus L                     -40 -64 2 -5.67  
  R                     37 -71 2 -3.87  
                                
Temporal                               
Fusiform gyrus R                     41 -49 -10 -4.54  
Parahippocampal gyrus L           -25 -43 -7 -4.54    -25 -37 -10 -5.45  
  R           20 -38 -7 -3.51    11 -46 -7 -4.78  
Superior temporal gyrus R                     50 -28 20 5.19  
Middle temporal gyrus L                     -64 -34 -7 5.39  
  R                     53 -31 -7 5.45  
  L           -49 -67 26 -5.66            
  R           41 -70 23 -4.59            
                                
Parietal                               
Posterior cingulate cortex L           -7 -52 26 -6.63            
Precuneus L                     -13 -67 29 4.36  
Supra marginal gyrus L -55 -52 32 28.39             -52 -49 29 5.89  
  R 47 -49 29 45.51             56 -58 26 5.82  
Inferior parietal lobe L -37 -34 32 20.53   -43 -34 38 5.52            
Left precentral gyrus L           -40 -19 56 7.01    -52 -13 35 -4.07  
  R 47 -1 32 21.51   44 -4 50 5.35            
Mid-cingulate cortex                       -1 -28 29 4.99  
                                
Frontal                               
Frontal eye field L -19 -7 50 28.06   -28 -10 44 4.74            
  R 25 -10 44 32.82   26 -13 44 4.49            
Supplementary motor area L -10 -10 56 51.66   -7 -7 50 5.52    -4 20 50 6.18  
  R 5 11 59 58.28   14 -1 56 5.62    8 18 55 5.07  
Middle frontal gyrus (posterior) L                     -34 8 44 4.55  
  R                     41 14 38 6.79  
Middle frontal gyrus (anterior) L                     -22 47 26 4.95  
  R 23 41 17 23.11             20 41 26 6.00  
Inferior frontal gyrus L                     -52 23 14 9.17  
  R                     50 20 14 4.86  
Anterior cingulate cortex 
(dorsal) 
L         
  
-7 5 38 4.72  
  
-4 26 32 5.61  
  R 8 11 32 43.38   8 5 38 7.10            
Superior medial frontal gyrus             -7 56 14 -5.24            
                                
Posterior insula R           35 -16 17 -4.94            
Mid-insula L -43 8 5 22.14   -43 5 8 4.07            
  R 47 8 -1 30.76   38 8 5 4.75            
Anterior insula L -31 26 5 27.04   -31 20 11 6.88            
  R 32 20 8 40.34   29 20 11 7.17    47 20 -1 4.15  
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  R 29 14 -4 28.46                     
                                
Subcortical                               
Midbrain/Ventral tegmental 
area 
L         
  
-10 -16 -13 4.72  
  
        
  R 8 -19 -7 22.3   11 -13 -10 5.41            
Thalamus L -5 -8 10 16.04                     
  R 5 -8 11 19.6   5 -13 -1 4.90            
Putamen L -22 2 -1 21.92   -25 -1 11 6.59            
  R 20 2 8 12.91   23 -1 11 5.42            
Caudate L           -10 8 2 5.41            
(dorsal) R 17 -7 20 45.42   20 5 17 6.26            
(ventral) R 8 5 5 22.16   8 2 2 7.17            
Nucleus Accumbens L           -10 10 2 5.15            
  R           10 10 2 5.84            
                                
Cerebellum L -19 -61 -31 32.51   -34 -43 -28 5.72            
  L -13 -79 -19 25.01   17 -46 -19 6.44            






Table 2. Conjunction analysis at delay phase (Peak talairach coordinates of minimum t(1,19) values) 
Peak location 
 
x y z t 
* 
Parietal 
     
 
Supra marginal gyrus L -52 -43 23 4.25 15 
 
R 56 -43 20 5.11 15 
Precentral gyrus R 35 -7 38 4.67 15 
      
 
Frontal 
     
 
Supplementary motor area R 2 5 50 4.82 17 
Anterior cingulate cortex 
(dorsal) 
R 5 11 35 5.59 
16 
 
R 5 29 35 4.86 13 
Middle frontal gyrus L -34 44 29 3.94 13 
 
R 29 47 20 4.49 15 
Anterior insula L -31 23 11 5.49 16 
 
R 32 20 8 6.30 17 
      
 
Subcortical 
     
 
Thalamus R 8 -13 -1 4.15 15 
Caudate R 8 5 5 4.30 14 
Ventral tegmental area R 8 13 -7 4.86 14 
      
 
Cerebellum L -25 -61 -31 4.29 15 
 
L -40 -49 -31 4.34 15 
 
R 26 -67 -25 3.56 14 




Table 3. ROI analysis in Amygdala based on delay-phase responses 
ROI Left Amygdala 
 
Right Amygdala 
   F(1,19) p     F(1,19) p 
Main effect of Reward 6.63 0.019 
 
1.36 0.258 
Main effect of Threat 0.00 0.996 
 
0.25 0.621 





Table 4. ROI analysis in BNST based on delay-phase responses 
ROI Left BNST 
 
Right BNST 
   F(1,19) p     F(1,19) p 
Main effect of Reward 7.39 0.014 
 
22.77 0.000 
Main effect of Threat 5.85 0.026 
 
2.25 0.150 









CHAPTER 3: Interaction between threat and aversive processing 
Introduction 
Motivation is one of the major determinants which influence behavior via “energization” (Elliot, 
2006) and/or “motivational salience” (Zink et al., 2004). Motivation can be divided into two 
aspects. One is appetitive (or approach), and the other is aversive (or avoidance) motivation 
(Elliot&Covington, 2001 for review). The appetitive motivation drives an organism toward 
appetitive stimuli/outcome (i.e. reward) whereas the aversive motivation makes an organism to 
withhold action or to get away from aversive stimuli/outcome (i.e. punishment).  
In neural mechanism of motivational processing, midbrain and striatum play a key role. 
Supporting evidence can be found in the studies using lesion and pharmacological manipulation 
(Parkinson et al., 2000; Cardinal et al., 2002; Smith&Dickinson, 1998; Taylor & Robbins, 1984; 
Cador et al, 1991). However, it is unclear that this “reward circuitry” is specific to reward-
predicting stimuli, or to punishment-predicting stimuli as well. In the animal literature, 
Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009) showed that some dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain of 
monkeys respond to airpuff-predicting stimuli as well as reward-predicting stimuli. In addition, 
in rats, a set of neurons in ventral striatum were found to respond during quinine as well as 
sucrose anticipation, whereas another set of neurons only responded during sucrose 
anticipation (Bissonette et al., 2013). 
Some human imaging studies have reported that reward-related regions such as ventral 
striatum were also involved during punishment anticipation with monetary losses (Carter et al., 
2009; Cooper and Knutson, 2008; Wu et al., 2014) or electric shock (Jensen et al., 2003). 
However, other studies reported that the neural substrates in the ventral striatum were altered 
depending on the valence of the reinforcement (reward or punishment) in terms of the 
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activation level (Tom et al, 2007) or location (Seymour et al, 2007). Finally, it has been reported 
that anterior insula and dorsal ACC are engaged by processing loss aversion (Fujiwara et al., 
2009; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Paulus et al., 2003).  
 The previous experiment in Chapter2 examined interactions between threat and reward. 
Analysis of SCR during delay period showed that the reward anticipation response was reduced 
under threat of shock. Imaging data during same period also revealed the interaction between 
threat and reward in several brain regions, including midbrain/VTA, striatum, BNST, anterior 
insula, right MFG, and dorsal ACC. The results suggest that reward and threat processing 
compete against each other. However, it is not clear which competition mechanism is involved 
in the interaction. One possibility is that, threat anticipation functioned as a “distractor”. 
According to dual-competition model (Pessoa, 2009), threat processing competes with cognitive 
processing for limited attentional resources. If threat processing used attentional resources, 
cognitive processing would be compromised. Given that reward enhances attentional control, 
cognitive control would experience a reduced reward effect under threat of shock. Alternatively, 
the competitive interaction effect might be due to opponent processing between threat and 
reward (Konorski, 1967; Solomon & Corbit, 1974). Thus, when both appetitive and aversive 
outcomes are expected (electric shock and monetary incentives), the intensity of a stimulus 
might be reduced by another stimulus having opponent valence. However, the results in 
Chapter 2 do not distinguish which of the competition mechanisms was involved because 
appetitive outcome (reward) depended on task performance but aversive outcome (electric 
shock) did not.  
To further investigate the competition mechanisms between threat and reward, a 
punishment condition was included in current study. Like reward, punishment can motivate 
behaviors in a way of leading an organism to avoid the aversive outcome. By adding punishment 
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condition, I could manipulate motivational valence (appetitive vs. aversive motivation) while 
mostly controlling motivational arousal. 
 Like the experiment in Chapter 2, I used a variant of the monetary incentive task (Fig. 
10A; Knutson et al., 2000). During the task, six types of visual cues were presented (Fig. 10B). 
The visual cues can be divided into two types. Threat cue informed participants about possibly 
receiving a mild electric shock which was independent on performance.  Motivation cue (reward 
or punishment cues) informed them about the chance of winning or losing monetary incentives 
depending on their task performance. Thus, participants were motivated by reward and 
punishment cues to maximize winning and minimize losing the incentives. 
I tested two competing hypotheses in key brain regions, including the midbrain, 
striatum, anterior insula, and dorsal ACC. According to the “resource hypothesis”, threat 
processing would utilize attentional resources which are necessary for other executive functions. 
Consequently, the impact of punishment on goal-directed processing would be reduced. Thus, 
responses during punishment anticipation would be decreased with threat compared to safe, 
just like reward responses under threat of shock. In contrast, according to the “valence 
hypothesis”, aversive motivation would be enhanced under threat whereas appetitive 
motivation would not be reduced. Thus, responses during punishment anticipation would be 
increased in threat compared to safe condition, whereas responses during reward anticipation 






Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Thirty volunteers participated in the study, which was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of the University of Maryland, College Park. Based on self-report, subjects were free from 
psychiatric or neurological disease or related past history. All participants were right-handed, 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave informed written consent. Three 
participants’ data were excluded from the analysis because of head motion exceeding 3 mm. 
Two other participants’ data were also excluded because of poor performance (over 25% error 
rates in general) compared to others (9.40%±4.25). Thus, data from twenty five participants 
(27.92±4.61 years old; 12 females) were included in the final analysis. 
 
Stimuli and behavioral paradigm 
Each trial started with the presentation of a visual cue stimulus (1 s), which was followed by 2 – 
6 s variable delay period (Fig. 10A). The visual cue was either rectangle- or diamond-shaped 
(safe or threat). A dollar or exclamation sign, or none of it was included in the geometric shape. 
The dollar and exclamation signs indicated the reward and punishment conditions, respectively. 
In control condition (no-reward and no-punishment), none of them was shown. The geometric 
shape (rectangle or diamond) indicated the Threat condition (safe or threat). Thus, six different 
types of cues were used (Fig. 10B). The dollar sign indicated the chance of winning monetary 
reward if the response was made correctly before the display disappeared. The exclamation sign 
indicated the risk of losing some of reward which was accumulated during the experiment if the 
response was incorrect or made after the display disappeared. The geometric shape (which was 
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counterbalanced across participants), indicated that a mild electric shock could be delivered 
before the onset of the target display (independent of performance). During the threat 
condition, physical shocks were administered 0.5 s earlier than target onset on 33% of threat 
trials. Participants were not informed about the probability of shock, and the shock timing was 
varied (1.5 – 5.5 s) after offset of threat cue. Thus, the shock administration was fairly 
unpredictable. To calibrate the intensity of the electric shock, each participant was asked to 
choose his/her own stimulation level immediately prior to functional imaging, such that the 
stimulus would be “highly unpleasant but not painful”. After each run, participants were asked 
about the unpleasantness of the stimulus and were asked to, if needed, re-calibrate it so that 
the shock still would be “highly unpleasant but not painful”. Shocks were administered with an 
electrical stimulator (Coulbourn Instruments, PA, USA) on the fourth (“ring”) and fifth (“pinky”) 
fingers of the non-dominant left hand. 
After delay period, a target display (0.69s) was presented at the center of screen. 
Participants were instructed to discriminate expression of a face target by pressing the index or 
middle finger button for neutral or fearful faces with the right hand as fast and accurately as 
possible (response button was counterbalanced). The duration of the target display was 
determined based on pilot study1. As noted, during reward and punishment trials, monetary 
gain and loss were based on accurate and fast performance. Consequently, participants were 
rewarded on about 87.7% of reward trials, and avoided punishment about 84.3% of punishment 
trials. 
 
                                                          
1
 In the pilot study, 16 participants performed facial expression discrimination task (fearful vs safe) with 
“stair-casing” procedure. Mean value of last 15 trials + 1 standard deviation was used for RT threshold in 




One second after target onset, participants received visual feedback (1 s) indicating 
their performance and monetary reward or punishment, as well as their cumulative earnings 
until that moment in time. During reward trials, participants won 20 cents per trial if they 
responded correctly before the target disappeared. The reward was indicated by presenting 
“+$0.2”. When they failed to get rewarded, “+$0.0” was displayed. During punishment trials, 
they lost 10 cents per trial if the response was incorrect or made after target was disappeared 
from display. When they successfully avoided the punishment, “-$0.0” was presented. 
Otherwise, “-$0.1” was displayed on the screen. During control trials (no reward and no 
Figure 10. Task design. (A) Subjects performed a variant of Monetary Incentive Delay task. During 
the threat-reward condition (shown here), a visual cue stimulus (diamond-shape overlaid with dollar 
sign) signaled that participants could win extra monetary reward if they respond accurately before the 
target display disappears and also a mild electric shock could occur at the onset of the target display 
(independent of the performance). Participants were instructed about the meaning of the cue stimuli 
prior to task execution. During the target phase, participants were asked to indicate whether the shape 
was a circle or a square. Following the target phase, participants received feedback about the 
monetary reward (B) Six different types of visual cues at the start of each trial informed participants 
about the motivation and threatening circumstances. 
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punishment), participants earned zero cents irrespective of their performance. Absolute value of 
punishment was half of the reward. I chose the asymmetric values based on the argument that 
the sensitivity to losses is higher than gains (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). On average 
participants earned $22 (beyond their base pay). During fast and correct trials across all 
conditions, visual feedback containing the words “Correct” was displayed with monetary 
reward/punishment. During incorrect or slow-correct trials across all conditions, visual feedback 
containing the words “Wrong” or “Too Slow”, respectively, was shown. Finally, a 1-5 s variable 
inter-trial interval (ITI) was given after offset of the visual feedback. 
A practice run was performed during the anatomical scan. The experimental procedure 
was identical to the “main runs” with the following exceptions. No physical shock was 
administered; participants were informed that they were not accumulating reward/punishment 
during practice even though they received feedback about monetary incentives; target faces 
displayed during practice run were not repeated during “main runs”. 
For the presentation of visual stimuli and recording of participant’s responses, 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) was used. Behavioral 
responses were collected using an MRI-compatible response box. Skin conductance response 
(SCR) data were also collected using the MP-150 system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., CA, USA) with a 
0.05 Hz high-pass hardware filter at a sampling rate of 250 Hz by using MRI-compatible 
electrodes attached to the index and middle fingers of the left hand. 
Each participant performed 9 “runs” of the main task (two participants had 7 and 8 
runs, respectively). Each run consisted of 48 trials, resulting in a total of 432 trials. All possible 
combinations of trial types were intermixed randomly but with the constraint that that each 
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possible trial combination occurred an equal number of times in terms of the stress, motivation, 
and facial expression. Gender of the face stimulus was also counterbalanced across trial types. 
To keep the trial types balanced after exclusion of the actual physical-shock trials (see 
Behavioral data analysis below), the subsequent trial type after the physical-shock trial always 
belonged to the safe condition. 
 
MR data acquisition 
MR data were collected using a 3 Tesla Siemens TRIO scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany) with a 32-channel head coil (without parallel imaging). Each scanning 
session began with a high-resolution MPRAGE anatomical scan (TR = 1900 ms, TE = 4.15 ms, TI = 
1100 ms, 1 mm isotropic voxels, 256 mm field of view). Subsequently, for each functional run, 
184 EPI volumes were acquired with a TR of 2500 and TE of 25 ms. Each volume consisted of 44 
oblique slices with a thickness of 3 mm and an in-plane resolution of 3 X 3 mm (192 mm field of 
view). Slices were positioned approximately 30 degrees relative to the plane defined by the line 
connecting the anterior and posterior commissures, helping to decrease susceptibility artifacts 
at regions such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. 
 
General fMRI data analysis 
Pre-processing of the data was done using tools from the AFNI software package (Cox, 1996; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). The first 3 volumes of each functional run were discarded to 
account for equilibration effects. The remaining volumes were slice-time corrected using Fourier 
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interpolation such that all slices were realigned to the first slice to account for the timing offset 
between slices. Six-parameter rigid-body motion correction within and across runs was 
performed using Fourier interpolation (Cox and Jesmanowicz, 1999) such that all volumes were 
spatially registered to the first volume. To normalize the functional data to Talairach space 
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988), initially each subject’s high-resolution MRPAGE anatomical 
volume was spatially registered to the so-called TT_N27 template (in Talairach space) using a 12-
parameter affine transformation; the same transformation was then applied to the functional 
data. All volumes were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian filter with a full-width at half 
maximum of 6 mm (i.e., two times the voxel dimension). Finally, the signal intensity of each 
voxel was scaled to a mean of 100. 
 
Voxelwise analysis 
Each participant’s fMRI data were analyzed using multiple linear regression with AFNI. There 
were six trial types for cue phase and 12 trial types for target phase. However, as hemodynamic 
responses may contain sustained responses during the anticipation of shock and 
reward/punishment, as well as transient responses for cue stimulus processing, two separate 
regressors were used for each event type during cue phase (Fig. 11): one is for modeling 
transient responses with a standard hemodynamic response function (Cohen, 1997), and the 
other is for modeling sustained responses with a duration-modulated boxcar function 
individually for each trial (function “dmBLOCK5” with “IM” option in AFNI; for related 
approaches, please see, Grupe et al., 2012). As an index of the sustained responses, I averaged 




There were a total of 24 main event types in the design matrix: during the cue phase, 
safe and threat events, separately for the control (no-reward and no-punishment), reward, and 
punishment conditions. The event types for cue phase separated into two phases, again: cue-
transient and -sustained. During the target phase, neutral and fearful face, separately for event 
types of cue phase. Threat trials that involved physical shock, subsequent safe trials, as well as 
error and RT outlier trials (see, Behavioral data analysis) were modeled separately using 
additional regressors of no interest (separately for the cue and target phases). Constant, linear, 
and quadratic terms were included for each run separately (as covariates of no interest) to 
model baseline and drifts of the MR signal. For the target phase data, because responses were 
expected to be transient and essentially canonical, all regressors were convolved with a 
standard hemodynamic response function (Cohen, 1997). Accordingly, response strength was 
indexed in the standard way (i.e., by estimating a single regression coefficient per condition). 
Event-related designs allow the estimation of different event types when they occur in 
a randomized fashion. However, the present study, by design, required a fixed order between 
the cue and target phases. Thus, I randomized the delay between cue and target phases as well 
Figure 11. Modeling of the BOLD signal during 
a trial. Hemodynamic responses to cue stimulus 
may contain transient response for stimulus-related 
processing and sustained response for anticipatory 
processing before target presentation. For a single 
trial, three distinct regressors were used: cue-
transient response (blue line), cue-sustained 
response (red line), and target responses (green 
line). Amplitude of responses and interval between 




as the inter-trial interval (for a similar strategy, see Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Choi et al., 2012). 
In this manner, correlations and variance inflation factor between different regressors for cue-
delay responses were lower than 0.33 and 3.26, respectively. It allowed me to estimate 
responses during the cue-delay phase separately from cue-transient and target phases. 
 
Group analysis 
Whole-brain voxelwise random-effects analyses were restricted to gray-matter voxels based on 
the FSL automated segmentation tool [“FAST” (FMRIB's Automated Segmentation Tool)] 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/). The main goal of this study is to investigate how the 
motivational processing of reward and punishment would be modulated by threat of shock 
during anticipation/delay phase. Thus, I initially conducted a repeated-measure ANOVA with 
Motivation (control, reward, punishment; safe and threat conditions were pooled) based on 
delay phase response. The alpha-level for voxelwise statistical analysis was determined by 
simulations using the 3dClustSim program of the AFNI toolkit. For these simulations, the 
smoothness of the data in three directions was estimated using 3dFWHMx on the residual time 
series of graymatter voxels in each participant and then averaged across participants (FWHMx = 
7.61 mm; FWHMy = 7.48 mm; FWHMz = 7.03 mm). Based on a voxel-level uncorrected alpha 
of .005, simulations indicated a minimum cluster extent of 32 voxels for cluster-level corrected 





Regions of interest (ROI) analysis 
In order to investigate the response patterns of the loci showing significant Motivation effect 
during the delay phase, I carried out an ROI analysis. For each participant, ROIs were defined in 
an independent fashion by using a leave-one-subject-out method. For each subject, I first 
created 5-mm radius spherical ROIs centered at the peak voxel of cluster showing the significant 
Motivation effect based on data from all subjects, except that subject. Then, for each of the six 
main conditions of interest, delay-phase responses of voxels that showed the significant 
Motivation effect in the “left-out” participants were averaged within the participant’s ROI. I 
repeated this procedure for each subject and thus was able to conduct subsequent analyses for 
each ROI defined in a non-biased fashion. Using the ROI data, two separate two-way ANOVAs 
were conducted, in which motivation-related conditions (control, reward, punishment) were 
broken down into two factors, Reward (control, reward) and Punishment (control, punishment). 
Then, I ran 2 Threat (safe, threat) x 2 Reward (control, reward) repeated-measure ANOVA and 2 
Threat (safe, threat) x 2 Punishment (control, punishment) repeated-measure ANOVA.  
 
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
Each participant’s SCR data were initially smoothed with a median-filter over 50 samples (200 
ms) to reduce scanner-induced noise and resampled at 1 Hz. The pre-processed SCR data were 
analyzed using multiple linear regression by using the AFNI software package (Cox, 1996; 
http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni) in the same way as fMRI data; for related approaches, please see 
Bach, Flandin, Frinston, and Dolan (2009) and Choi et al., (2012). There were six trial types for 
cue phase and 12 trial types for target phase. There were a total of 18 main event types in the 
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design matrix. Trials that involved physical shock, subsequent safe trials, as well as error and RT 
outlier trials were modeled using three additional regressors of no interest. No assumptions 
were made about the shape of the SCR function. Average response to each trial type was 
estimated via deconvolution. Responses were estimated starting from event onset to 15 s post 
onset using cubic spline basis functions. This method is closely related to the use of finite 
impulses (“stick functions”), the commonly employed technique that can be considered the 
simplest form of basis expansion. Cubic splines allow for a smoother approximation of the 
underlying responses, instead of the discrete approximation obtained by finite impulses. 
Constant, linear, and quadratic terms were included for each run separately (as covariates of no 
interest) to model baseline and drifts of the SCR. As an index of response strength, for each 
event type, I used the peak estimated response between 5–6 s after stimulus onset (as 
determined via the spline-based estimates). In order to equalize variance, response-strength 
indices were transformed by using a logarithm function [log10(1+SCR)]. As in the ROI analysis, 
two separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted on the log-transformed SCRs: 2 Threat (safe, 
threat) x 2 Reward (control, reward), and 2 Threat (safe, threat) x 2 Punishment (control, 
punishment). The alpha-level was .05. 
 
Behavioral data analysis 
Trials during which actual shocks were delivered and the subsequent (safe) trials were discarded, 
thus leaving 24 trials per trial type. Trials with response time (RT) exceeding three standard 
deviations from the condition-specific mean were discarded from further analysis (0.36 %) as 
outliers. Trials in which participants made incorrect responses (9.40%) were also excluded from 
further behavioral analyses, but “slow” trials during which a correct response was made after 
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the target disappeared were included. For each participant, mean RT data were determined as a 
function of Threat (safe, threat), Motivation (control, reward, punishment), and Face (fearful, 
neutral). Additionally, two separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted on the mean RT data: 2 
Threat (safe, threat) x 2 Reward (control, reward), and 2 Threat (safe, threat) x 2 Punishment 
(control, punishment). The alpha-level was .05.  
 
Results 
Skin Conductance Responses 
The main purpose of current study was to investigate how punishment processing is influenced 
by threat compared to how reward is influenced by threat. Accordingly, two separate ANOVAs 
were conducted (Fig.12A): Threat (safe, threat) x Reward (control, reward) and Threat (safe, 
threat) x Punishment (control, punishment). In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Reward 
(control, reward), a main effect of Threat showed a trend to significance (F1, 24 = 4.01, p = .057), 
indicating greater SCRs in threat condition than safe. Main effect of Reward and interaction 
effect of with Threat were not observed (Fs < 0.26). In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X 
Punishment (control, punishment), a main effect of Threat did not reach significance (F1, 24 = 2.68, 
p = .115). A main effect of Punishment and the interaction effect with Threat were not detected 








Reaction time data were evaluated according to a 2 Threat (safe, threat) x 3 Motivation (control, 
reward, punishment) x 2 Face (neutral, fearful) repeated–measures ANOVA. A significant main 
effect of Motivation was detected (F2, 48 = 29.72, p < .001). Participants showed faster RT in 
reward (549 ms) condition than punishment (562 ms; t24 = 4.17, p < .001) and control (572 ms; 
t24 = 6.75, p < .001) conditions. Mean RTs were also faster in punishment than control (t24 = 4.29, 
p < .001). The main effect of Threat was not significant (F1, 24 = 0.74), and interaction between 
Threat X Motivation showed a trend to significance (F1, 24 = 2.43, p = .099). The 3rd factor, Face, 
showed a main effect (F1, 24 = 2.43, p = .099), and interaction effect with Threat (F1, 24 = 8.57, p 
= .007), but not with Motivation (F2,48 = 0.31). Finally, a 3-way interaction was detected (F2, 48 = 
4.11, p = .023). 
The 3-way interaction implies that the impact of threat and reward/punishment on 
behavior would be dependent on the affective property of target stimulus such as fearful face 
Figure 12. SCR and behavioral results. (A) SCR data during delay phase revealed significant main 
effect of Threat, but not interaction effect with reward or punishment. (B) Reaction time data during 
neutral trials revealed that threat showed marginally significant interaction with reward, but 
interaction effect with punishment did not reach to significance. Error bars in all panels denote the 
standard error of mean. A.U., arbitrary units. 
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(Robinson et al., 2012). In order to exclude the influence of face expression on performance, I 
ran the subsequent analyses only during “neutral” face trials (Fig.12B). It allowed me to 
compare the behavioral data with imaging data during the cue-delay phase. In addition, the 
main purpose of current study is to investigate how punishment processing is influenced by 
threat compared to interaction between threat and reward. Thus, like in SCRs data, the 
Motivation factor was broken down into two parts, Reward (control, reward) and Punishment 
(control, punishment), and two separate ANOVAs were conducted, Threat (safe, threat) x 
Reward (control, reward) and Threat (safe, threat) x Punishment (control, punishment).  
In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Reward (control, reward), a main effect of 
Threat showed a trend to significance (F1, 24 = 4.23, p = .051). Mean RTs in threat condition (573 
ms) was slower than safe (565 ms). A significant main effect of Motivation was detected (F1, 24 = 
25.21, p <.001). Mean RTs in reward condition (557 ms) was faster than control (581 ms). Of 
interest, a moderate interaction effect was detected (F1, 24 = 3.86, p = .061). To investigate the 
source of the interaction effect, t-tests were conducted. Mean RTs during safe-reward trials (550 
ms) were shorter than threat-reward trials (564 ms; t24 = 2.61, p = .015). There was no difference 
between safe-control (580 ms) and threat-control conditions (581 ms; t24 = 0.38). The analysis of 
Threat (safe, threat) X Punishment (control, punishment) also showed a main effect of 
Punishment (F1, 24 = 9.54, p = .005). Mean RTs in punishment condition (569 ms) were faster than 
control (581 ms). However, a main effect of Threat and the interaction effect with Punishment 






Functional MRI results 
In voxelwise analysis, a significant Motivation effect was observed in several structures including 
bilateral striatum (peaked at ventral caudate), bilateral anterior insula, and dorsal ACC (Fig. 13, 
Table 5). I selected bilaterally caudate, anterior insula, frontal eye field (FEF), midbrain/VTA, and 
dorsal ACC for ROI analyses. Previous studies showed that midbrain structures were recruited 
during aversive processing as well as appetitive processing (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009; 
Carter, et al., 2009). The caudate is also engaged during both reward and punishment 
anticipation (Carter et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2014) as well as electric shock (Choi et al., 2012; 
Figure 13. Cue-delay phase responses. (A) Voxels that showed significant main effect of Motivation 
(displayed at p < 0.05, cluster-level corrected). MB, midbrain; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; 
Ant. Ins, anterior insula (B) Mean estimated hemodynamic responses from left and right ventral 
caudates. Error bars in bar plots denote the standard error of mean. 
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Jensen et al., 2003). The anterior insula was indicated to process aversive events (Paulus & Stein, 
2006). However, it also responds to cue stimulus signaling monetary gains (Liu, et al., 2011; 
Padmala and Pessoa, 2011) and monetary losses (Knutson and Greer, 2008). Finally, the dorsal 
ACC was suggested to function in “adaptive control” (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Shackman et 
al., 2011). However, it also participates in processing of reward (Bush et al., 2002; Shidara & 
Richmond, 2002; Shima & Tanji, 1998) and loss aversion (Fujiwara et al., 2009; Kuhnen and 
Knutson, 2005).  
 
Left caudate. In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Reward (control, reward), a main effect of 
Threat showed a trend to significance (F1, 24 = 4.20, p = .051), indicating responses in the left 
caudate was greater during safe. A significant main effect of Reward was detected (F1, 24 = 34.39, 
p <.001), showing greater responses during reward than control. Of interest, the reward effect 
was modulated by threat (F1, 24 = 5.68, p = .025). To investigate the source of the interaction 
effect, t-tests were conducted. Responses during safe-reward trials were shorter than threat-
reward trials (t24 = 3.83, p < .001). There was no difference between safe-control and threat-
control conditions (t24 = 0.06). In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Punishment (control, 
punishment), a significant main effect of Punishment was observed (F1, 24 = 12.91, p = .002). 
Responses during punishment were greater than control condition. However, main effect of 
Threat and the interaction effect with Punishment did not reach to significance (Fs1, 24 < 0.68). 
 
Right caudate. In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Reward (control, reward), a main effect 
of Threat showed a trend to significance (F1, 24 = 2.82, p = .106), indicating responses were 
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greater during safe. A significant main effect of Reward was detected (F1, 24 = 34.39, p <.001), 
showing greater responses during reward than control. The interaction between Threat and 
Reward did not reach to significance (F1, 24 = 2.03, p = .167). However, the t-tests revealed that 
responses during safe-reward trials were greater than the responses during threat-reward trials 
(t24 = 2.60, p = .016) whereas there was no difference between safe-control and threat-control 
conditions (t24 = 0.32). In the analysis of Threat (safe, threat) X Punishment (control, 
punishment), a significant main effect of Punishment was observed (F1, 24 = 9.18, p = .006). 
Responses during punishment were greater than control condition. However, main effect of 
Threat and the interaction effect with Punishment did not reach to significance (Fs1, 24 < 0.26). 
 
Other brain regions. The repeated-measures ANOVAs of Threat X Reward and Threat X 
Punishment were conducted using ROI data from bilateral anterior insula, midbrain, and dorsal 
ACC. However, none of those regions showed a main effect of Threat and interactions of Threat 
X Reward and Threat X Punishment (Fs < 2.28). 
 
Discussion 
In the current experiment, two competing hypothesis were tested to investigate how threat 
interaction with reward and punishment. According to the “resource hypothesis”, task-
irrelevant threat recruits attentional resources that are also used by goal-directed processing for 
winning reward and avoiding punishment. Thus, both reward and punishment processing would 
be reduced by threat. Alternatively, the “valence hypothesis” predicts that processing aversive 
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stimuli opposes processing appetitive stimuli. Thus, threat would not interact with punishment 
processing but it would interact with reward processing. 
To investigate how reward and punishment processing is modulated by threat of shock, 
I used a task with motivational cues signaling the chance of monetary reward or punishment, 
and a threat cue signaling a chance of mild aversive shock. The experimental design used here 
allowed me to measure responses during the preparatory/anticipatory delay phase to probe the 
impact of threatening stimuli on motivational processes independent of stimulus processing. In 
behavioral data, it was observed that both of reward and punishment have beneficial effects on 
behavior (i.e., faster face discrimination responses). However, threat counteracted the reward 
effect but not the punishment effect. SCR data revealed greater responses during threat than 
safe. In imaging data, a main effect of Motivation was observed in various regions related to 
reward processing. Particularly, the bilateral caudate, anterior insula, midbrain, and dorsal ACC 
were engaged to motivational context more strongly (reward, punishment > control condition) 
regardless of its motivational valence, parallel with previous studies (e.g. Carter et al., 2009). 
Importantly, in left caudate, the impact of anxiety/stress on motivational processing was 
observed only in appetitive (reward anticipation), but not in aversive circumstances 
(punishment anticipation). In right caudate, the interaction effect of threat with reward as well 
as punishment was not observed. However, direct comparison of reward trials in safe and threat 
conditions showed that responses to reward were smaller in threat than safe. Overall, the 
findings suggest that threat has specific effects on appetitive motivation but not on aversive 
motivation. 
Ventral striatum, including nucleus accumbens and caudate, have been indicated as one 
of the main regions related to reward and punishment processing (Carter et al., 2009; Cooper 
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and Knutson, 2008; Wu et al., 2014). Some human imaging studies reported that the neural 
substrates in the ventral striatum were altered depending on the valence of the reinforcement 
(reward or punishment) in terms of the activation level (Tom et al, 2007) or location (Seymour et 
al, 2007). Recently, Bissonette et al., (2013) demonstrated that different populations of neurons 
in ventral striatum participate in reward and punishment anticipation. The results in current 
study revealed that caudate is responsible for punishment processing as well as reward, but its 
engagement level in motivational processing can be modulated by aversive processing. 
Anterior insula and dorsal ACC are involved in threat- and reward-processing (Banks et 
al., 2007; Everitt et al., 2003; Fujiwara et al., 2009; Kalin et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 2005;Liu et 
al., 2011; Mizuhiki et al., 2012; Mobbs et al., 2010), and interconnected with striatum (Haber 
and Knutson, 2010). In the previous experiment in Chapter 2, I observed an interaction between 
threat and reward in both of anterior insula and dorsal ACC. However, this interaction was not 
replicated in the current experiment, in which two motivational conditions were used (reward 
and punishment). Also, the main effect of Threat was not observed in those regions even though 
behavioral and SCR data showed the main effect of Threat. The weak effect of threat was 
somewhat unexpected given the previous results in Chapter 2. One possibility is that, additional 
trial type (punishment) was included in current experimental design compared with the 
previous experiment while the degree of freedom of the error term (number of subjects) was 
similar to the previous study. It might lead to larger error term size, resulting in weak detecting 
power of the interaction effect. Similarly, participants experienced motivating situation (reward 
or punishment condition) twice as often as the non-motivational situation (control condition). 
Perhaps, the overall motivation level during the current experiment was higher than the 
previous experiment which had only reward trials. The relatively heightened motivation level 
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might reduce the impact of threat, reducing the power to detect interactions between threat 
and reward. 
In the safe condition, responses to punishment were smaller than reward. One 
possibility is that absolute magnitude of monetary punishment was half of the reward. We 
selected the ratio of punishment value to reward to balance motivation level between reward 
and punishment, based on previous studies (Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Tom et al., 2007) 
because it was suggested that sensitivity to loss is higher than gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Even though the impact of punishment was less than reward in the current study, the additive 
effect of threat on punishment is still supportive to “valence hypothesis” because the 
punishment effect was not reduced under threat of shock. Another possibility is that, in reward 
and punishment conditions, participants were instructed to discriminate target face as fast and 
accurately as possible to win and avoid losing monetary incentives. For successful avoidance of 
punishment, participants were forced to engage on the target stimulus. If the “task engagement” 
led to tendency of approaching behavior, it would conflict with the property of punishment 
whereas it is compatible with property of reward (Hardin et al., 2006). 
 
Competition and integration 
In current study, interaction effect between threat and reward was observed. Specifically, 
responses in caudate during safe-reward trials were reduced compared to the responses during 
threat-reward trials. In contrast, in same site, responses to punishment were not influenced by 
threat of shock (Fig. 13). If threat processing competed with reward/punishment processing for 




reward (Fig.14B). However, analysis of behavioral and imaging data did not showed the 
decreased responses to punishment in threat condition. Therefore, it is more plausible that 
impact of threat modulates motivational valence of reward and punishment rather than 
processing resources. 
How does the threat of shock influence the motivational valence of reward and 
punishment? One possible way is that individual valence of threat and reward/punishment 
would be integrated into an overall valence. For instance, when both monetary reward (positive) 
and electric shock (negative) is anticipated, an overall valence will be smaller than reward-only 
condition. Thus, responses to reward will be weaker under threat of shock than safe (Fig.14C). 
Some human decision-making studies provided supporting evidence that reward valuation was  
Figure 14. Effect of threat on processing resources and/or valence. Green squares represent responses to 
punishment. Blue squares represent responses to reward. Red arrows represent effect of threat. (A) 
Responses to reward and punishment in safe condition. (B) If threat affects processing resources, 
responses to both reward and punishment will be decreased. (C) If threat affects valence, responses to 
reward will be decreased whereas responses to punishment will be increased. (D) If threat affects both 
resources and valence, responses to reward will be decreased. However, change of responses to 




reduced when physical pain is accompanied by the rewarding outcome (e.g. Park et al., 2011; 
Talmi, et al.). On the contrary, when both threat and punishment is anticipated, an overall 
negative valence will be greater than punishment-only condition. Recently, Robinson et al (2011, 
2012) showed that responses to fearful face (vs. happy face) were enhanced under threat of 
shock. The results suggest that aversive processing (fearful face or punishment anticipation) can 
be amplified under aversive circumstances (threat of shock). 
Figure 15. Effect of threat on executive functions. (A) Threat of shock will recruit attentional/effortful 
resources that are shared with other executive functions. Individual component of executive functions 
are represented by color squares. (B) Processing to achieve goal (reward) would be improved by 
sharpening the processing (represented by outline of blue square), and utilizing the “common 
resources”. (C) The impact of reward on executive function will be reduced by threat in two ways: 
occupying “common resources” (arrow with solid line) and blunting the goad-directed processing 
(arrow with dashed line). (D) During punishment processing, threat will use the processing resources 
(arrow with solid lie). At the same time, threat will amplify negative valence of punishment (arrow with 
dashed line). Consequently, the impaired processing due to lack of resources will be compensated. 
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However, it does not completely rule out the possibility that threat functioned as a 
“distractor”. If threat affected motivational valence without influencing processing resources, 
responses to punishment should be increased as a function of negative valence when electric 
shock was anticipated (Fig.14C). However, I could not found the evidence showing that 
responses to punishment change depending on threat. It suggests that threat might affect both 
of attentional resources and motivational valence: decrease of available resources for goal-
directed processing and increase of negative valence (Fig.14D). 
According dual-competition model (Pessoa, 2009), processing of emotional stimuli 
demand attentional/effortful resources which are required for other executive functions. If the 
resources are utilized in processing of task-irrelevant emotional stimulus (e.g. electric shock), 
cognitive processing for task performance is impaired (Fig.15A). However, if reward is 
anticipated, executive functions will be enhanced. In dual-competition model, two mechanisms 
of reward effect are hypothesized. One is that reward processing recruits processing resources 
from “common-pool”. The other is that motivation to win reward sharpens the executive 
function related to goal achievement (Fig. 15B). Results in current experiment suggest that 
threat processing influences both effects of reward: the recruitment of attentional/effortful 
resources for reward processing can be distracted by threat (arrow with solid line in Fig.15C). In 
addition, the aversive valence of threat would reduce the appetitive valence of reward, thus 
improvement of executive function by reward would be relatively blunted (arrow with dashed 
line in Fig.15C). When punishment is anticipated, executive functions will be enhanced like 
rewarding circumstances: recruitment of additional resources and improvement of goal-directed 
processing. If threat is anticipated in punishment circumstances, the “common resources” is still 
be utilized by threat processing (arrow with solid line in Fig.15D). However, the impact of threat 
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would enhance the punishment-related processing because punishment and threat have same 
“sign”. Thus, the overall impact of threat on punishment would not be great. 
Taken together, the present study partially supports the idea that threat processing 
influences anticipatory processing of appetitive outcome (reward), but not the anticipatory 
processing of aversive outcome (punishment). However, the results should be interpreted 
carefully because the previous results in Chapter 2 about the interaction between threat and 
reward were not fully replicated. The threat effect was relatively weak and the interaction effect 





Table 5. Voxelwise analysis at delay phase (Peak talairach coordinates, F2,48 values) 
    Main effect of Motivation 
Peak Location   x y z F2,48 
Occipital           
Middle occipital gyrus L -10 -97 2 15.01 
  R 20 -88 5 13.27 
            
Temporal           
Inferior temporal gyrus L -52 -49 -13 13.12 
  R 44 -37 -22 10.07 
Middle temporal gyrus L -46 -57 26 12.83 
  R 59 -46 23 14.31 
            
Frontal           
Frontal eye field L -19 -4 62 11.59 
  R 29 -7 50 9.79 
Supplementary motor area   2 -10 59 11.58 
Anterior cingulate cortex   -4 20 35 8.85 
Middle frontal gyrus R 32 44 32 13.96 
Superior frontal gyrus L -22 26 53 12.95 
Ventro-medial prefrontal cortex   -4 26 -10 11.12 
Rostral medial prefrontal cortex   -1 53 14 9.63 
            
Anterior insula L -25 20 -1 24.46 
  R 35 26 2 21.98 
            
Subcortical           
Thalamus L -7 -13 2 12.92 
  R 8 -19 14 16.91 
Caudate L -7 2 2 26.18 
  R 8 5 5 30.31 
            





CHAPTER 4: Concluding remarks 
This dissertation investigated how reward and punishment processes are affected by 
anxiety/stress elicited by threat of electric shock. The first study used fMRI to examine the 
interaction between threat and reward processing to test two competing hypotheses. According 
to the “salience hypothesis”, enhanced activation would be observed in the condition involving 
both reward and threat because of increased salience. However, according to the “competition 
hypothesis”, reward and threat processing trade-off against each other leading to reduced 
activation in that condition. Analysis of skin conductance data during the delay phase revealed 
an interaction between reward and threat processing, such that the effect of reward was 
reduced during threat and the effect of threat was reduced during reward. Analysis of imaging 
data during the same task phase revealed competitive interactions between reward and threat 
processing in several regions, including the midbrain/VTA, caudate, putamen, BNST, anterior 
insula, middle frontal gyrus and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. The interaction effect observed 
in multiple sites suggests competitive processes between threat and reward when they were 
processed simultaneously. 
The competitive interaction between threat and reward can be interpreted in two ways. 
According to the dual-competition model (Pessoa, 2009), threat processing competes for 
attentional/effortful resources with other executive functions while reward improves processing 
efficacy possibly by reallocating available resources. The contrasting properties of threat and 
reward might have led the competitive interaction of them. Alternatively, competitive 
interaction between threat and reward might be due to valence of anticipated outcome. When 
both appetitive and aversive outcomes are expected (electric shock and monetary incentives), 
valence intensity of a stimulus might be reduced by another stimulus having opponent valence 
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(Konorski, 1967; Solomon & Corbit, 1974). However, the experimental design in previous study 
in Chapter 2 does not allow me to explain which mechanism was employed because electric 
shock and monetary reward had different properties along two dimension, valence and 
response-contingency. In previous experiment in Chapter 2, participants were informed about 
aversive and/or appetitive outcome on every trial. Aversive outcome was a mild electric shock 
which was occasionally administrated regardless of performance. Appetitive outcome was a 
visual feedback about monetary incentives depending on task performance. 
One possible way to investigate the mechanism of the competitive processes would be 
to test interactions involving threat and punishment, because punishment is an aversive 
stimulus that also motivates behavior (Elliot&Covington, 2001; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). 
Therefore, in the second fMRI study, I expanded the factorial design to include punishment in 
addition to threat and reward. By adding punishment condition, I could manipulate outcome 
valence (appetitive vs. aversive) while largely controlling motivational arousal. Two possible 
scenarios were tested: the “resource hypothesis” and the “valence hypothesis”. According to 
the “resource hypothesis”, reduced activation would be observed in the condition involving 
threat and punishment and the condition involving threat and reward because resources used 
by threat processing would reduce motivational impact of punishment and reward. The “valence 
hypothesis” also predicts reduced activation in the condition involving threat and reward 
because processing of aversive stimulus would oppose appetitive stimulus processing. However, 
the processing of punishment and threat would be additive because both stimuli are aversive. 
Analysis of behavioral data revealed that responses were facilitated in reward and punishment 
trials. The effect of reward interacted with threat as in the first experiment. However, the effect 
of punishment was not influenced by threat of shock. In parallel with behavioral data, imaging 
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data showed that the reward specific effect of threat was observed. Specifically, in caudate, 
responses during reward anticipation were reduced under threat of shock. However, responses 
to punishment were not influenced by threat. 
Taken together, I investigated interactions between aversive and appetitive processing 
during anticipation of outcomes in normal healthy adult volunteers. In the first study, imaging 
data showed a trade-off pattern in regions such as midbrain, striatum, BNST, anterior insula, 
right MFG and dorsal ACC. In the second study, the competitive interaction between threat and 
reward was replicated in left caudate. However, in the same site, the interaction effect between 
threat and punishment was not observed. The findings from two studies suggest that aversive 
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